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Modeling the sensory roles of noradrenaline in action selection
Maxime Carrere1,2,3 and Frédéric Alexandre2,1,3
Abstract— Noradrenaline participates in the neuromodula-
tion of brain activity to modify the trade-off between ex-
ploration and exploitation when sensory contingencies have
changed. Accordingly, attentional models of noradrenaline act-
ing on sensory representations have been proposed. In this pa-
per, we explore another possible action of this neuromodulator
in the decision making process and report simulation results
that illustrate that its role is concerned with different aspects
of sensory processing. This is made possible by the extension of
a classical model of action selection, to render it able to detect
and to adapt to sudden changes in sensory contingencies, which
is a major characteristic of autonomous learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reinforcement Learning is among the major learning
paradigms used to model decision making [1]. Whereas
bayesian approaches have been successfully proposed to
address noisy environments [2], no fully satisfactory solution
has been proposed to date, concerning unstationary and
changing environments [3] which are nevertheless classical
environments for humans and animals and represent a major
paradigm to be addressed in autonomous learning.
Neuromodulation has been presented as a clever way to
modulate the main parameters of classical reinforcement
learning algorithms [4]. Among the four main ascendant
neuromodulators, noradrenaline is proposed in that paper
to control the randomness in action selection or, to tell it
differently [5], to control the trade-off between exploration
and exploitation, depending on the level of uncertainty. The
neuronal model presented in [5] consists in two sensory
units representing alternative choices, the gain of which
can be modulated by noradrenaline. This model is very
interesting because it is very simple (two accumulators in
mutual inhibition) and also because it has nice mathematical
properties [6]. Nevertheless it also has important limitations,
the first one about the fact it is limited to binary decisions [7].
Another important limitation is about the fact that this model
has been only presented and tested in isolation, focusing on
attentional effects of noradrenaline on the sensory cortex.
In natural conditions, dealing with evaluation of the level
of uncertainty and triggering the exploration of alternative
solutions are performed in a complex network, involving not
only sensory representation implemented in [5] but also a
more systemic network, particularly involving the prefrontal
cortex, like it has been observed in experimental studies [8].
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Relying on biological data, we present here a wider model
of the effects of noradrenaline on brain functioning, extend-
ing the regions in consideration to the network between the
basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex, known to be central in
the domain of action selection [9]. To better present the main
features of this extension, we first present some important
characteristics of reinforcement learning and of neuromod-
ulation related to uncertainty, before presenting these new
features and their evaluations in simulations involving a
systemic model of the cerebral network.
II. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Reinforcement Learning (RL, [1]) has ambiguous relations
with Cognitive Computational Neuroscience [10]. In the
process of modeling the brain and particularly cognitive
and behavioral functions, it is often mentioned that RL
is a too simple and too schematic process to capture the
complexity of the brain. Nevertheless, principles, concepts
and algorithms elaborated in RL researches are often evoked
because they remain the best way to introduce some brain
mechanisms. In this paper, we will continue to conform to
this dual relation.
In the process of action selection, state-values and action-
values are among the most central concepts in RL and
emphasize two critical evaluations: the value of the state of
the environment and the value of the action to select, as a
function of some kind of cumulative reward. The actor-critic
architecture [11], widely used in RL, exploits these com-
plementary concepts and is also reminiscent of underlying
behavioral paradigms [12], pavlovian conditioning (learning
the value of a stimulus) and operant conditioning (learning
in some context the value of the action). The cerebral
implementation of this architecture has often been discussed,
particularly comparing the architecture of the basal ganglia
with the actor module [13], whereas several hypotheses have
been proposed concerning the critic, localized in the ventral
striatum [13] or in the projections between dopaminergic
region VTA and the striatum [9].
The limitation of the analogy between the actor-critic
architecture and the corresponding cerebral implementation
arises from the fact that the architecture doesn’t integrate
enough details about the underlying learning mechanisms.
The temporal difference learning algorithm [1] used in the
actor-critic architecture refers to model-free learning algo-
rithms directly selecting an action with no explicit a priori
evaluation. This is indeed the case in habitual behaviors
but not in goal-directed learning, another important learning
paradigm in operant conditioning corresponding to model-
based learning. Both kinds of learning have been localized
in respectively dorsal and medial regions of the striatum [14]
but efficient model-based algorithms remain to be proposed.
In natural learning, goal-directed learning is very powerful
because, in addition to selecting an action, it allows to
explicitly evoke the consequences of the action and can
explain phenomena like devaluation but can also trigger
prospective evaluations [15].
In fact, interestingly, whereas this latter issue is widely
discussed about the actor, it is hardly remarked that the same
could be said about the critic, also learned in a model-free
way whereas data suggest that it can also be sensitive to
devaluation [16]. Accordingly, some authors have proposed
the same distinction in the ventral striatum, with a region,
the core of the nucleus accumbens, standing for the model-
free version of the critic, whereas the shell of the nucleus
accumbens would correspond to a model-based learning
[17]. In behavioral studies, this could correspond to the
distinction between, respectively, the preparatory and the
consummatory phases of pavlovian conditioning [15], with
the consummatory phase automatically triggering actions to
consume the outcome, explicitly evoked when the reward is
close, whereas the preparatory phase is not specific of the
outcome and simply acts to favor the approach when the
reward is still distant.
Another striking difference between natural and artificial
studies is the fact that artificial studies generally consider one
paradigm at a time, whereas they are in fact coexisting. [18]
shows for example that goal-directed and habitual responses
correspond to different phases of training but that both are
available if needed. [19] has shown in rats that the decision of
the best paradigm to employ is taken in the medial prefrontal
cortex, massively projecting to the striatum. The arbitration
between computationally simple but rigid habits and flexible
and efficient but costly model-based approaches has also
been shown to depend on the level of uncertainty of the
environment [20].
III. COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty in the sensory world is an important dimen-
sion to take into account, to adapt to noisy and chang-
ing conditions. Neuromodulation has been presented as a
major way to adapt neuronal processing and learning to
these conditions [21], with acetylcholine signaling expected
uncertainty (or stochasticity) and noradrenaline signaling
unexpected uncertainty (or changes in sensory criteria asking
for the exploration of new sensory rules). Other more detailed
models have presented the influence of acetylcholine [22]
and noradrenaline (also called norepinephrine, NE) [5] as
acting on the sensitivity of neurons in sensory cortical
regions, modifying their signal-to-noise ratio. Concerning
noradrenaline, other known effects in other regions of the
brain have not been investigated in models, and particularly
an inhibitory effect in the shell of the striatum [23] that we
would like to study in more details here.
In a systemic view of brain functioning, wondering how
the kind of (expected or unexpected) uncertainty is esti-
mated and how the more adapted neuromodulator is released
accordingly is also of prime importance. It is proposed
in [24] that important criteria in that aim are about the
contrast between long and short term histories of conflicts of
responses and about history of rewards, with all these pieces
of information encoded in the medial prefrontal cortex.
This is another good reason to study the consequences
of noradrenergic modulation of activity in the shell, in the
ventral striatum, which is also known to be a major target
of medial prefrontal cortex projections [12].
IV. OUR MODEL
In order to study this effect, we have adapted and extended
an existing model of action selection, described in [25]. In
short, this model reproduces a classical experiment where
monkeys learn to get rewards by manipulating levers, de-
pending on visual cues presented beforehand. This is carried
out in a model implementing several loops between the
basal ganglia and the cortex, including a cognitive loop (cf
the green section in figure 1) featuring afferences from the
medial prefrontal cortex (region OFC known to represent
the value of the stimuli involved in the task [26]) to the
ventral striatum, modulated by a learning driven by reward
prediction error, proposed to be implemented by dopamin-
ergic projections as in most biologically inspired models of
decision making; see [25] for details.
In addition to stochastic associative rules between cues
and rewards studied in [25], we would like to consider
here cases where the associative rules have changed and
new solutions must be explored. To do so, we have to
introduce new mechanisms for detecting the occurrence of
this unstationarity and for triggering exploration of new rules,
instead of exploiting a no longer valid rule. Reconsidering
the implementation of the shell in the ventral striatum was
also an opportunity for us to improve the computation of the
dopaminergic reward prediction error by taking the values
computed in the shell as the prediction to be confronted to
the actual reward in the dopaminergic nucleus VTA, as it is
proposed in more realistic dual-pathway learning rules [27].
Our model uses the DANA library for neuronal rep-
resentation and computation [28]. All the code for the
model and parameters are open-source and available online
at https://github.com/carreremax/basal-ganglia-ne. We only
describe and discuss here changes made from the Guthrie
model, shown in figure 1. Figure 2 reports new parameters
that have been introduced by the extension of the model
and existing parameters that have been modified to keep a
functioning model, even when the shell is inhibited by NE.
In order to detect an uncertain situation, we compute the
difference between reward arrival s reward in the most
recent trials and reward arrival l reward in a larger number
of (less) recent trials.
s reward is the average reward in the last
n recent trials trials :
s reward = (
∑
k∈n recent trials
rewardk)/n recent trials
with rewardk the reward received at trial k. Similarly,
l reward is the average reward in the last n long trials.
Guthrie's model
Cognitive loop
Associative and 
motor loops
ActionReward
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Fig. 1. Main differences between our model and [25]. ST-PRED and LT-PRED are respectively short-term predictor and long-term predictor which
predict reward arrival as the average reward from a short and long sequence of trials. Each prediction inhibits the excitatory influence of the other in ACC
(modeling a region of the medial prefrontal cortex, known to be involved in conflict monitoring [29]), thus performing an “XOR” function between the
two predictions. Only if these predictions are different, NE release will be performed, and will trigger exploration by facilitation of cortical excitation and
inhibition of striatal inputs. The value of the stimulus to be considered, CS selected in the ventral striatum, is used to compute the reward prediction error
in the dopaminergic nucleus VTA, used to train the connection between OFC and the ventral striatum.
The difference between s reward and l reward is com-
puted in two neuronal populations n l and n s, as a model of
another region of the medial prefrontal cortex, ACC, known
to monitor such kinds of conflicts [29] and introduced in the
present extension of the model:
dUne s
dt
= τ ∗ (−Une s + s reward− l reward)
dUne l
dt
= τ ∗ (−Une l + l reward− s reward)
The neuronal population Une l computes the above zero
value of |s reward| minus |l reward|, while Une s com-
putes the other one, |l reward| minus |s reward|. Thus the
level of NE release, ne, taken as the sum of nes and nel
activities, is high if s reward and l reward are different,
when the rule is changing, and correlates with unexpected
uncertainty. In case of expected uncertainty, the levels of
rewards are the same at short and long terms and the
corresponding level of stochasticity can be deduced from
comparison to the maximal rewarding situation [24].
Consistent with classical models of NE [5], NE effect at
the cortical level is an excitatory gain :
dVctx
dt
= f(Uctx ∗ (1 + 1 + ne) ∗ (1 + noise))
where Vctx and Uctx are respectively the firing rate and
membrane potential of cortical neurons, f and noise re-
spectively the sigmoid function and activation noise used in
[25]. Because of the threshold effect of f , already salient
stimuli do not have a huge increase in activity, while stimuli
with initially low salience may increase a lot, thus facilitating
alternative choice and exploration, as proposed in [5].
As an original mechanism introduced in the model, NE has
also an inhibitory effect at the striatal level, which impacts
the output gain of projection from cortex to shell. This
inhibitory effect lessens the impact of learnt weights between
cortex and striatum in the decision loop, and thus favors
exploration-driven decision.
gain = g ctx cog str cog ∗ ne modulation
with g ctx cog str cog the constant gain between cortex
and striatum in the cognitive loop, and ne modulation the
modulatory effect of NE.
ne modulation = max(0.5, 1− ne efficiency ∗ ne)
NE modulatory effect is limited to halving excitatory projec-
tions from cortex to shell, consistent with the effect of NE
observed in [23]. ne efficiency is a constant set to 0.8, so
that only maximum values of ne will provoke a minimum
value of ne modulation.
The other difference between our model and [25] is the
computation of the prediction error. In both models, values
of stimuli to be considered, CS, are learnt in the connections
between OFC (cognitive cortex in [25]) and the shell of the
striatum (cognitive striatum in [25]). Learning depends on a
prediction error
dw = ERR ∗ Vctx ∗ Vstr ∗ α
where α is the learning rate, Vctx is the presynaptic cortical
activity, Vstr the post-synaptic striatal activity, and ERR
the prediction error, which correlates with the influence of
dopamine on learning, and is computed as the difference
between the current reward and the expected reward. Pre-
viously, this expected reward was computed as the sum of
all the previous prediction errors (similar to the Rescorla-
Wagner rule). Yet this predicted value was not correlated
with the network value of the stimulus. For example, if
the network is making the good choice because of habitual
behavior (resulting from another loop in the Guthrie model),
the critic can learn the value, will not make prediction error
anymore and will stop the network learning. Yet the cognitive
part of the network may not have learnt the current CS value.
To address both this problem and the non-neural way the
expected reward was computed, we use the value of the CS
in the shell as the reward prediction.
ERR = reward− α str ∗ Vstr
with α str a scaling constant. Thus, it both prevents the
network from stopping learning before having the relevant
Architectural parameters
Parameter Meaning Value
α LTP learning rate for long term potentiation 0.0001
α LTD learning rate for long term depression 0.00005
g ctx cog str cog gain from cognitive cortex to cognitive striatum 1.2
g ctx cog str ass gain from cognitive cortex to associative striatum 0.3
g ne exc gain of excitatory projections in NE populations 1.0
g ne inh gain of inhibitory projections in NE populations -1.0
n st trials Number of trials taken into account for the short-term predictor 3
n lt trials Number of trials taken into account for the long-term predictor 30
α str Gain for striatal activity in the prediction error 0.025
Fig. 2. As compared to [25], the values of the first four parameters have been modified to take into account the fact that the activity of the ventral
striatum can be inhibited. The other five parametes are new and have been introduced in the extension of the model.
value in the cognitive striatum and is reminiscent of biolog-
ical data, with the inhibitory projection from the striatum to
VTA exploited in dual-pathway dopaminergic models [27].
V. EXPERIMENTS
To test specifically the network ability to detect changes
in reward contingency and switch from exploitation to
exploration, we applied it to a classical task in operant
conditioning, reversal learning, also known to be a classical
paradigm to observe NE release when the rules are reversed
[30]. At each trial, 2 stimuli are simultaneously presented
to the network for 2500ms, randomly distributed between 2
positions. As soon as the model performs an action, reward
is distributed according to the probability of the chosen CS.
If no CS is selected after the 2500ms of presentation, the
network will not receive any reward. Then we let the neural
activities go down to their initial values and the next trial
starts. During the first phase, the acquisition phase, for 80
trials, the 2 stimuli are rewarded respectively 100% and 0%
of the time. During the second phase, the reversal phase,
the same stimuli are presented to the network with their
respective reward probabilities switched, so that the network
has to detect the change in reward contingency and switch
to the newly better rewarded rule.
In fig.3, we report the average performance and decision
time on 100 reversal experiments. Each experiment is per-
formed with a “naive” model. The model correctly learns to
choose the best rewarded CS during the acquisition phase and
switch to the other during the reversal phase. However, NE
release allows to perform random exploration immediately
after the first trials of reversal, as shown in fig.3.A by a
quick increase of the performance to chance level just after
reversal, and then to gradually learn from this exploration. In
addition NE release also increases the decision time of the
model during the first trials of reversal (fig.3.B). This is in
accordance with [31] results, showing that animals with NE
depletion respond with greater rapidity when perseverating.
Fig.3.C shows the release of noradrenaline during trials,
which is indeed proportional to unexpected uncertainty, with
a peak at the reversal onset.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Noradrenaline has been presented for a long time as
signaling changes on sensory aspects of the sensorimotor
associations to be learned by animals to display an adapted
behavior [32], whereas more recently, tonic dopamine has
been proposed to have the same role when the changes
are concerned with motor aspects [33]. It is consequently
not surprising that NE effects have been mainly studied in
the sensory regions and particularly in the posterior parietal
cortex dedicated to selective attention [32]. Nevertheless
NE is also reported to modify activity in a specific striatal
region, the shell, and we were consequently curious of
better understanding its rationale and we have presented the
corresponding study in this paper.
First, whereas the striatum is generally described as a
motor region, we have explained above that the shell in the
ventral striatum is a specific region possibly corresponding to
a model-based version of the critic where sensory values are
explicitly manipulated. Consequently, considering now that
the shell is also the only region in the striatum to receive NE
does not challenge the sensory role of this neuromodulator
[32]. Second, whereas the classical role of NE is generally
excitatory, increasing the gains of sensory neural activities,
another specificity of its action in the shell is that it is
inhibitory. Our simulations show that, whereas the classical
role in sensory regions favors exploration of new sensory
alternatives, its role in the shell would be rather to inhibit
the previous rule, no longer valid.
In addition to these major functional results, our model
also includes an original mechanism to detect unexpected
uncertainty, from estimations of recent and long-term re-
wards. Whereas we propose, consistent to biological data
[29], that the integration might take place in ACC, we should
investigate more precisely where and how each term is
estimated. We think that they may represent two different re-
ward predictions computed in different brains areas, namely
the hippocampus from the recent one and the amygdala or
prefrontal cortex for the other one, as we will study in
forthcoming work, extending again the systemic aspect of
our implementation of decision making.
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Fig. 3. Reversal experiment for our decision making model. Each curve is the average of 100 experiments performed each time with a “naive” model.
Surrounding shaded areas indicate the standard deviation for each curve. (A) Average performance by trials. Network is able to learn reward contingency
before and after reversal. At the reversal onset (green line), the NE network detects the change in reward contingency and triggers exploration, which
results in a quick increases of the network performance to chance-level, thus exploring the different possibilities and learning the best one. (B) Average
convergence time. During the first trials of reversal, exploration by inhibition of the striatum induces a larger response time for NE model. (C) Average
release of NE. NE release is important at the beginning of exploration and larger during the first trials of reversal. It correlates with unexpected uncertainty.
